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The history of war and peacekeeping has little to say about languages or the people who 
work with them, yet a closer inspection shows that contacts between different languages 
and the presence of an interpreter were a routine experience during the peacekeeping 
and peace building operations conducted by the UN and NATO in Bosnia Herzegovina. 
This paper shows how political, strategic, tactical and economic pressures affected the 
working lives of local civilians employed as interpreters/translators/linguists and the 
soldiers from the multinational force who served as military interpreters. In so doing, it 
argues that the history of interlingual communication deserves to be included in the 
history of conflict. 
 The United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations 
in Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) to safeguard humanitarian aid convoys and protect the 
UN safe areas during the war (1992–95), then implement and uphold the Dayton peace 
agreement which laid out BiH’s post war settlement, required a multi national 
assortment of soldiers and civilian defence staff to encounter a place of which they 
mostly knew little and forced the remaining inhabitants of BiH to encounter them. 
Indeed, the activities of ‘peacekeeping’ comprised a multitude of intercultural 
encounters not only between the peacekeepers and the local civilian and military 
populations but also between the soldiers from more than 30 different national and 
military cultures who worked together at headquarters, in logistics or engineering 
projects, on weapons inspections and in combined training exercises. Most intercultural 
interactions were also encounters between languages. They could rarely be 
accomplished without at least one interlocutor resorting to a language which was not his 
or her mother tongue or alternatively without the involvement of an interpreter or 
translator.  
Studies of the interpreter in war and international relations concentrate on 
interpreters’ privileged access to power holders and their capacity to control the 
transmission of information. Some historians have also begun to investigate the military 
and diplomatic uses of languages during the First World War, when area experts and 
native speakers were employed to produce propaganda,
1 and in the Ottoman Empire, 
where a corps of long term resident dragomans in Constantinople produced political and 
commercial news, intelligence and knowledge for the Ottoman court, the foreign 
diplomats they served and the multi generational dragoman families to which they often 
belonged.
2 However, most historical works about conflict interpreters concern the Second World War or after, reflecting the professionalization of interpreting after the 
trials of German war criminals. 
To date, the emphasis in studies of Second World War interpreters has either been on 
court interpreting, as at the Nuremberg trials,
3 or on intelligence work.
4 Roger Dingman, 
for instance, has shown that US forces struggled to recruit trustworthy interpreters for 
the Pacific theatre amid the national paranoia about Japanese Americans. The cadre of 
white military linguists, Dingman argues, had to overcome their socialization as combat 
soldiers earmarked to fight the Japanese enemy in order to build on the methods of their 
language training and develop an empathy with the civilians that troops encountered 
and interned.
5 Meanwhile, Navajo and Comanche men were famously recruited as ‘code 
talkers’ in order to outwit Japanese interception of radio signals in theatre.
6 Trust and 
origin were as problematic in Australia as in the US: Australian military linguists also 
served in the Pacific theatre, but those with immigrant backgrounds experienced 
discrimination and were unable to take posts open only to commissioned officers.
7 For 
the period after 1945, several memoirs by interpreters who worked for eastern bloc 
leaders during the Cold War were published in the West as insights into the thought 
processes of personalities such as Stalin, Gomułka and Gorbachev.
8 A small number of 
linguist memoirs have also emerged from the war in Iraq.
9 
In published accounts of the peacekeeping operations in BiH, the figure of the 
interpreter is usually on the margins. Usually, interpreters are the occasion for a story 
about the devastation of the area in which the memoirist served, the destruction of pre 
war multi ethnic Sarajevo or the atmosphere of suspicion among the three ethnic groups 
involved in the conflict. The interpreter flits in and out of recollections of meetings with 
hard drinking generals, tense moments on patrol or off duty nightlife. Although it is 
common to acknowledge, like Bob Stewart (the commander of the first British battalion in BiH), that ‘their work was crucial to the achievement of our mission’,
10 very little 
research and very few books have taken the individuals who facilitated language 
contacts as their point of departure. Nonetheless, working and often living with an 
interpreter was part of many peacekeepers’ everyday lives – just as working and often 
living with peacekeepers was part of the interpreters’ everyday lives.  
The UN mission to BiH began in 1992, initially as an extension of its monitoring and 
peacekeeping activities in neighbouring Croatia. The United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) headquarters set up outside the conflict zone, in Sarajevo, found itself on 
the front line in April–May 1992 when BiH declared independence and fighting broke 
out between the Bosnian Croat army (HVO), the Bosnian Serb army (VRS) and the 
army of the Sarajevo government, which tended to be understood as the Bosniak army 
(ABiH). UNPROFOR’s mandate was extended to BiH itself and its task of securing aid 
convoys later extended to protecting the UN safe areas and monitoring no fly zones 
After a peace agreement was signed at Dayton in December 1995, UNPROFOR was 
replaced by a NATO led force which aimed first to implement the agreement (e.g. with 
frequent weapons inspections) and then stabilize the country, which Dayton had divided 
into the Republika Srpska (RS: Serb Republic) and the Muslim–Croat Federation. 
Recent scholarship on the war in BiH encourages us to see it as a multi dimensional set 
of local conflicts which intersected with the strategic objectives of the major armies 
involved and to recognize that the image of an essentialist ethno religious war was 
consciously disseminated by elites who benefited from a continuation of hostilities.
11 
However, the prevailing public representation of the Bosnian conflict in the states which 
contributed troops to the peacekeeping effort was of a long standing antagonism 
between three clearly defined groups, the Bosnian Croats (Catholic), the Bosnian Serbs 
(Orthodox) and the Bosnian Muslims (Muslim; the alternative term ‘Bosniaks’ is also used to distinguish ethnic and religious identity). To talk about three sides or factions is 
somewhat simplistic but reflects the understanding of most peacekeepers
12 – and the 
reality imposed on Bosnians whether they subscribed to it or not. 
The work of ‘interpreters’ sometimes took them beyond what the linguistic 
profession understands as interpreting (spoken communication between languages) and 
into translation (written communication, drawing on a different set of skills). Usually 
without clear job descriptions, those involved in language work could be interpreters 
and translators in the same working day, although the term ‘interpreter’ is in common 
military use for referring to local civilian language staff. This paper follows the usage of 
the author’s interview participants by preferring the term ‘interpreter’ for locals and for 
military personnel whom they or others described as such. So as not to exclude written 
communication from the account altogether, ‘linguist’ has also been used as a general 
term for those employed to carry out language work. ‘Translator’ is used when authors 
under discussion who have used it, although none of the terms should be taken to imply 
that an individual did or did not have a certain qualification – especially in the chaotic 
wartime period, where some of the most hazardous language work was undertaken by 
young local staff with none.  
The situation of interpreters and language contacts in BiH sits at the intersection of 
matters raised by several disciplines. Recent developments in translation studies, for 
instance, give sound theoretical reasons for studying formal and informal translation 
and interpretation – ‘language contacts’ of all kinds – in conflict. Mona Baker has 
observed that translators and interpreters in conflict situations are always ‘firmly 
embedded in a series of narratives that define who they are and how they act in the 
world’. Moreover, she argues, they cannot ‘escape responsibility for the narratives they 
elaborate and promote through their translating and interpreting work’.
13 Meanwhile, Michael Cronin has argued for ‘a critical translation studies’ which would interact with 
social theory, security studies and globalization research.
14 There is a trend in south east 
European area studies towards investigating the relationship between locals and 
internationals in places such as BiH which have experienced significant inflows of 
international personnel, capital and ideology as the so called ‘international community’ 
attempts to reshape local social and political relations.
15 The anthropologist Andrew 
Gilbert, for example, thus emphasises how OSCE internationals’ limited knowledge of 
the local language in BiH excluded them from critical flows of information and forced 
them to stake their reputation on the abilities of their local interpreters.
16 Militaries 
themselves, meanwhile, have begun to give higher level consideration to the concept of 
‘operational language support’ – how to recruit or employ people with the required 
knowledge, how to train them and how best for other personnel to work with them. 
Drawing on oral history interviews with individuals who were involved with 
peacekeeping in BiH as part of the British Army or NATO, as well as published UK, 
US and Dutch sources, this paper outlines how the working lives of local interpreters 
and linguists from the troop contributing countries changed as international strategies 




During the war: UNPROFOR (1992–95) 
 
The militaries that contributed to UNPROFOR, which were still largely on a Cold War 
footing when the Bosnian conflict broke out, contained very few personnel who already 
spoke the language they had known as ‘Serbo Croat’. Once the peacekeeping forces arrived in BiH, it became apparent that the mission required extensive interaction with 
the local community as well as the armies involved in the conflict, requiring a high level 
of language support. The solution was to hire local interpreters for every UNPROFOR 
office, every military observer team and the bases of the many battalions which formed 
part of the UN force. The employees were usually teachers or students of foreign 
languages. Some were professionals in other areas, such as the doctor who worked as an 
interpreter for the British general Michael Rose (Rose claimed this doctor, a Croat, had 
been prevented from working at the Sarajevo hospital because of his ethnicity),
17 and a 
remarkable number were engineering students and/or the children of engineers. 
Especially in smaller towns, young people might be hired before they had finished their 
studies or even secondary school. The successful candidates received payment in hard 
currency, a job while troops were stationed in their location, and access to necessities in 
short supply – shelter, protection and food. 
Comparatively the largest amount of material available in the UK on local 
interpreters during the UNPROFOR stage relates to UNPROFOR’s first British 
battalion, The 22nd (Cheshire) Regiment, which deployed to BiH from December 1992 
to June 1993 with a cavalry squadron attached for reconnaissance. When the 
commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Bob Stewart, made a preliminary visit to BiH 
to work out where to base the battle group, the CO of a nearby Canadian battalion 
advised him to recruit fifteen interpreters as ‘a very high priority’. Although the 
Cheshires also had a British military interpreter with a Serbo Croat degree available 
(Captain Nick Stansfield), he was unable to stay permanently in the battle group’s base 
at Vitez, so local interpreters would be indispensable. Indeed, Stewart wrote in his 
memoir that he had already anticipated the need to recruit ‘a considerable number of 
native speaking interpreters, probably with a mix of Serb, Croat and Muslim backgrounds’.
18 They made their first hire when a squadron commander ‘had located a 
woman who might be able to do the job’ and ‘[a]fter coffee, she agreed to a salary of 
200 Deutschmarks’.
19 As the battalion became aware of the risks to interpreters who 
remained in their own homes and were vulnerable to intimidation by local forces, they 
started to be put up in houses UNPROFOR had rented in Vitez for officers’ 
accommodation – at 600 Deutschmarks a month when the local average monthly wage 
was 100 Deutschmarks. The owners of the captains’ house had apparently moved into 
their cowshed so that they could rent out their home.
20 One of the Cheshires’ 
interpreters, Dobrila Kolaba, had initially stayed living with her parents in Novi Travnik 
and travelling every day to the Vitez base. The officers found her space in their 
accommodation, but despite the precautions she was murdered – ‘deliberately targeted’, 
Stewart suspected – by a sniper in July 1993.
21  
The British battalions needed even more interpreters as the conflict went on and 
British commanders refined their understanding of the UNPROFOR mandate to secure 
the passage of aid convoys. The British approach, pioneered by Stewart, was to conduct 
intensive liaison with the so called ‘warring factions’ and negotiate local ceasefires to 
let the convoys through (UK troops would apply a similarly robust understanding to 
their mission to guarantee the UN Safe Area of Goražde in 1994–95). By 1993–94, 
when the 1st Battalion, Duke of Wellington’s Regiment (1 DWR), was based in 
Bugojno (another town in central Bosnia), the battalion employed 41 interpreters, of 
whom some were refugees from elsewhere. The British military interpreter who 
recruited and managed the interpreters’ cell there, Captain Louise Robbins, remembered: 
 
they’d come from, you know, they’d been driven out of other places, and in 
Bugojno […] it was all shelled out, there were um, Bosnian Muslims living in Serbs’ houses, cause they’d been driven out, and there were Serbs living in 
Bosnian Muslims’ houses, cause they’d been driven out, but this crowd of 
wonderful, mainly young people […] they were a hotch potch of um Serb, er, 
Bosnian Muslim, Croatian, mixtures, and they were all friends. You know, to 
them they were young, it didn’t matter. Um. But to others it, it would.
22 
 
In this physically, socially and economically devastated area, demand for employment 
with the peacekeeping force was high. ‘You only have to tell one person locally that 
there’s someone giving work,’ Robbins remembered, ‘and you’re fighting them off at 
the door.’
23 When young people arrived at the camp gate and said they could speak 
English, they were interviewed to make sure that they actually could do so and then put 
through a United Nations testing process (including translation between English and the 
local language(s) in both directions) so that they could obtain a personnel number and 
ID card. UNPROFOR required that interpreters were aged 18 years or more and only 
allowed one member of each family to have a job with the UN – although applicants 
could circumvent this requirement by answering ‘no’ in the relevant section of the form.  
Interpreters had the legal status of UNPROFOR employees, unlike other locally 
hired civilians such as cleaners, mechanics, laundry assistants or kitchen hands. The 
Dutch battalions stationed in Srebrenica had had to recruit their non UNPROFOR 
employees through the local town council (‘opština’). The opština attempted to 
monopolize recruitment for jobs with peacekeepers and NGOs, limited the amount of 
time one person could be employed with such organizations and preselected candidates 
for employment, privileging existing residents over refugees who had arrived in 
Srebrenica and were in even more need of work.
24 UNPROFOR legal status did not 
exempt interpreters from interference by the local authorities. In 1994, one town’s mayor told UN civilian staff that paying the interpreters at the regular UN rate would 
unbalance the local economy and asked for half their salaries to be paid to the opština so 
that he could supply the interpreters with food. The UN representatives agreed, to the 
disgust of officers in the battalion where the interpreters worked. Interpreters from 
Srebrenica, Goražde and Pale have reported more direct harassment by the local 
authorities in order to set them up as an intelligence source or to obstruct the 
peacekeepers.
25  
The UN end of the recruitment process for interpreters did not appear well adapted to 
the realities of the war zone. To obtain an ID card required a photograph, which 
refugees who had fled with nothing might well not have. One interviewee remembered 
applicants having to cut their own faces out of precious family photographs and, on one 
occasion, a civilian clerk melting an interpreter’s only photograph in a laminator. The 
problem was overcome when somebody acquired a Polaroid camera. The translation 
tests were processed and graded further up the line by United Nations staff, and the 
grade achieved determined the rate of pay. On occasion, the testing process fell foul of 
the ethnicized language politics in BiH. If the marker was a Croat, Serbianisms in the 
text might be marked down, even though they were naturally part of the linguist’s 
idiolect and/or were appropriate for the area in which the linguist would be operating.
26 
The officer in charge of interpreters within a battalion was also responsible for 
equipping them. 1 DWR required every patrol to have an interpreter on the grounds that, 
without communicating with the locals, the infantry could not perform its primary role 
of dominating the ground and gathering intelligence. This policy contrasted with the 
Dutch approach to patrols during the UNPROFOR period, where an interpreter would 
usually not be taken even on the ‘social patrols’ which aimed to ‘take the pulse’ of the 
civilian population through informal conversations – although by 1999 the Dutch troops in SFOR were ‘often’ taking an interpreter on social patrols.
27 Given the constant risk of 
sniper fire while outdoors, obtaining protective equipment for civilian interpreters was a 
matter of survival. Louise Robbins found she had to negotiate with the battalion 
quartermaster for flak jackets and helmets and protested that ‘[y]ou can’t send soldiers 
out with flak jackets on and protection and the interpreters without, ’cause a bullet will 
go straight through them, you know, it’s not fair.’ Military clothing reduced the risk of 
an interpreter being picked out by snipers, but their difference could never be concealed: 
 
with the best will in the world those interpreters were never going to look like 
soldiers. They didn’t walk like soldiers, they didn’t do their jacket up, I, I used 
to tell them every morning, for goodness sake, you want to look like us, do your 
combat jacket up, do your laces up properly, tuck your, tuck your trousers in, tie 
your hair back, you’re a target. And they didn’t carry weapons of course, which 
was the other obvious giveaway. 
 
Female interpreters tended to stand out even further: 
 
You know, the girls won’t tie their hair back into a tight bun, it’s not glamorous. 
 
Ultimately, no amount of precautions could be foolproof. For instance, it was not 
unknown for the breastplates in interpreters’ flak jackets to be sold on, even though the 
battalion inventoried them as expensive ‘starred items’ and investigated any 
disappearances. 
The understanding of the Bosnian conflict as an ethnic or ethno religious war – an 
understanding which the elites of the groups involved in the conflict and the international policy makers who saw themselves as alleviating or preventing it 
collaborated to produce – required hiring interpreters from the three different ethnicities 
in order to liaise with Croat, Serb and Muslim interlocutors. For these purposes, 
interpreters who had a mixed family background and/or had identified themselves 
before the war as ‘Yugoslav’ would find themselves classified into one of three ethnic 
groups. The practice showed yet another dimension of the ‘war on ambiguity which 
accompanied and legitimated the physical conflict in BiH, but was necessary to ensure 
the interpreters’ safety and also to reassure the military forces they would be liaising 
with. Louise Robbins quickly learned ‘not to send a Bosnian Muslim to the Serb 
confrontation line to interpret at a meeting, because they […] couldn’t interpret because 
they thought they were going to be shot.’
28 A Bosniak interpreter on the same team did, 
however, volunteer to accompany a convoy through VRS lines into the Bosniak enclave 
of Goražde. Guards at a VRS checkpoint refused to let him through because his ID bore 
an obviously Muslim name, and Robbins ‘had to find another volunteer to go, who was 
of the right ethnicity, right religion.’
29  
The risks of encountering the forces which opposed those of one’s ‘own’ ethnicity 
were manifested during the fall of Srebrenica, when a Bosniak interpreter who had been 
hired to work inside the enclave accompanied a Dutch UN military observer to a 
meeting with the VRS’s general, Ratko Mladić. Mladić accused him of having been in 
the (Bosniak) army and alluded to the risk that a VRS soldier might go mad and shoot 
him, at which the interpreter fled. In Potočari, where one Dutch company was based, 
Mladić later confronted another interpreter who had in fact fought against the VRS and 
threatened to shoot any more Bosniak interpreters sent to him by the Dutch.
30 
Interpreters’ fears of encountering the opposing army were not immediately assuaged 
by the peace agreement. A US newspaper reporter recalled that in 1996, shortly after the arrival of IFOR, he and the female Bosniak interpreter who worked for him drove up to 
a point on the Inter Ethnic Boundary Line where there had been a VRS checkpoint a 
few days before: 
 
[S]he gripped the steering wheel and she looked at us and she said, you would 
bring me this close? And I said, oh no no no, they’re gone. And she wasn’t even 
listening, she was furious, and she was shaking. And all of a sudden you began 
to know what they meant by rape is a weapon. And… and she didn’t talk to us 
the rest of the way back to Tuzla, and we had to promise her that we would 
never take her close to Serbs again.
31 
 
Stories such as this illustrate the difficulties in achieving one of the main and unfulfilled 
goals of the ‘international community’, the return of refugees to areas where they had 
been or would be an ethnic minority. As late as 2000, a Serb linguist working for SFOR 
in Banja Luka who was offered a job two pay grades higher in another SFOR office 
refused the promotion because it would have meant moving to Sarajevo, although 
apparently did move there some years later.
32 
A young person’s employment with an UNPROFOR unit (or an international 
organization) often reconfigured the family dynamic, where the children in the family 
unit – sometimes on an enforced break from university or even fresh from secondary 
school – would find themselves supporting their own parents and often members of 
their extended family. Many, but not all, interpreters were women, hence their role as 
breadwinner reversed gender as well as age relations within a family. Fewer men of the 
same age were available for employment because men were liable to conscription, yet 
some men fought willingly and others less so. Working for an international employer provided an alternative and (somewhat) safer environment, as long as the employer 
could stand up to the relevant army’s demands to free up men of military age for the 
front. The UK military linguist Miloš Stanković wrote that a male interpreter employed 
by the Cheshires (whose parents were Bosnian Muslim and therefore he too was 
ethnically classified as one, although he would have preferred to think of himself as a 
Yugoslav) had served in a Bosniak army unit early in the war. In Stanković’s account of 
their conversation, the interpreter remembered that during a Croat attack on his trench at 
Novi Travnik he had ‘just cowered in the trench and thought “f*** this” [original 
retains expletive]… that’s why I’m an interpreter.’
33  
Working as an interpreter could enable one to partially detach oneself from 
participating in violence. Simultaneously, it could provide a way of directly supporting 
a particular group in the conflict. The Dutch battalions at Srebrenica widely suspected 
that certain interpreters also worked as informants for the Bosniak army (ABiH) – but 
despite these security fears interpreters and local women employed as cleaners still had 
access to the battalion and company operations room, where they were able to observe 
timetables, rosters, a logbook, an outgoing mailbag and a waste paper bin full of 
envelopes with the return addresses of soldiers’ family members (evidently, the risk was 
not judged sufficient for soldiers to be tasked as cleaners).
34 In Croatia, some Croats 
who responded to the European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM) advertisement 
for translators did so because they themselves wanted to present the Croatian side of the 
war to the international monitors for whom they were translating the experiences of 
victims and refugees. In practice, however, they found that they could not reconcile the 
‘positions of the witness and the translator’ and had either to adopt the professional 
subjectivity of neutrality or the witness’s subjectivity of testimony.
35  British soldiers were able and likely to socialize with interpreters off duty, although 
rules on fraternization varied between national contingents and the experience of 
working for a UK battalion may not have been representative of every UNPROFOR 
interpreter’s experience. One strand of a memoir by Lieutenant Monty Woolley, an 
officer in B Squadron, 9th/12th Lancers, concerns his close but platonic relationship 
with an interpreter called Majda, the daughter of the mayor of Tuzla. B Squadron was 
initially stationed in Vitez with the Cheshires, at around the time when interpreters were 
coming to live on the base. On 9 January 1993, Woolley wrote in his diary that a fellow 
lieutenant: 
 
has invited three female interpreters to live in the subaltern’s house. They claim 
to have been displaced from their own homes. Consequently I could not get into 
the bathroom tonight and when the electricity came on at 0600 hours the house 
fuses were immediately blown by Layla’s hair drier. I had to have a cold water 
shave again. Thank goodness I am leaving tomorrow.
36  
 
Once Woolley had left Vitez for Tuzla, however, he himself socialized frequently with 
two local women who worked for the British as interpreters, Majda and her friend 
Sandra. He recalls that ‘[f]ar from [being] unattractive anyway, the girls were becoming 
more desirable with every day we spent separated from our normal peacetime lives’,
37 
though also relates taking care not to let the relationship go further than a back rub. 
Many other flirtations did, however, lead to a sexual relationship between a male soldier 
and a local female interpreter. Louise Robbins recalled that she: 
 struggled to keep the women interpreters out of bed with the soldiers. Er, it’s 
inevitable, war does funny things to you, um, but where women were married to 
Serb army commanders, [sex was] not a good idea. Soldiers don’t care, out on 
patrol, they do their best to get her in a, get her in a shelled out building, um… 
and the girls are up for it, cause you know, they might get something out of it.
38 
 
British accounts of peacekeeping in BiH are usually tinged with respect and even 
tenderness towards interpreters. A more critical picture of a relationship between UN 
troops and local interpreters, in a contingent where different standing orders applied, 
appears in the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation’s report into the activities 
of the Dutch battalions in the Srebrenica enclave before and during the catastrophic 
attack by the Bosnian Serb army (VRS) in July 1995. Here, the interpreters – who in 
this case seemed mainly to be male – perceived a ‘deep gulf’ between themselves and 
the Dutch soldiers. One resented the fact that he had not received a sleeping bag or food 
during a visit to an observation post and generally felt that ‘he was considered to be a 
sort of translation machine’, while others called the Dutch soldiers ‘showboys’ for their 
smart clothes, hair and vehicles. Interestingly, the report suggests this relationship may 
have improved when the VRS blocked the Dutch supply lines and the international 
soldiers were subject to the same shortages and constraints which had characterized 
everyday life in the enclave since the outbreak of war. Contacts between troops and the 
local population were more and more tightly restricted during the three Dutch tours in 
Srebrenica as the commanders’ security concerns increased and the relationship with the 
local authorities worsened.
39 Clearly, further research is needed to give a fuller account 
of locals’ experiences as interpreters in different contingents, places and periods.  
 After Dayton: IFOR and SFOR (1995–2000) 
 
The signing of the Dayton peace agreement in December 1995 brought about 
institutional as well as practical changes in interpreters’ working lives. UNPROFOR 
was replaced by a NATO commanded force, first called the Implementation Force 
(IFOR) and then, after a year, the Stabilization Force (SFOR). The peacekeeping forces 
already in BiH removed UN insignia, painted vehicles in camouflage colours instead of 
UN white and adopted more robust rules of engagement, intended to show that NATO 
would back up the Dayton agreement with force. Interpreters too remained in their jobs, 
and more had to be hired as the full complement of IFOR troops arrived. Recruitment 
procedures differed depending on whether one was employed by a national contingent 
or the multinational force’s headquarters. National contingents’ employees came under 
whatever testing, pay, discipline and training arrangements that country’s armed forces 
had made for local staff (human resources support for British employees was provided 
by logistics personnel at the Banja Luka Metal Factory base). The headquarters, which 
also covered branches at several other locations in BiH and two logistics bases in 
Croatia, recruited locals through a Civilian Personnel Office but lacked a systematized 
management structure for interpreters until several years into SFOR’s presence.  
The experience of 2 Light Infantry (2 LI), the British battalion which served in BiH 
between October 1995 and April 1996, provides a snapshot of the changeover from 
UNPROFOR to IFOR – although in this case transition seems to have had little impact 
on the working lives of its interpreters. 2 LI employed some 40 interpreters, enough for 
each patrol and platoon. These locals, as usual, tended to be university educated or 
students who had (still) not resumed their studies. Some had been recruited by previous 
British battalions and had kept on working for whichever battalion had rotated in. Most were female, and ‘[m]ost had become the breadwinner in their family’ on their wage of 
US $ 800 per month (approximately 1100–1200 Deutschmarks at 1995–96 rates). They 
‘wore British uniform, without badges or head dress’, and, according to the battalion 
commander, Ben Barry, ‘could not resist doing everything they could to make 
themselves as attractive as possible’ – although ‘[l]eadership and self discipline’ 
apparently prevented the soldiers ‘allow[ing] the attractive female interpreters to be 
more than just people who translated.’ The battalion continued to task interpreters 
according to their ethnic origin as well as their skill level, which Barry presented as a 
mark of respect for the security concerns of the ‘faction leaders’ he met as well as a 
mitigation of the intelligence risk.
40  
Local interpreters’ working lives could change every six months as battalions rotated 
in and out: the locals had to adapt to the ways different commanders chose to run their 
bases (for instance, altered security regimes) and get to know a different military 
supervisor (the junior officer, usually a logistician or an attached educator, who gave 
them tasks and handled discipline) every time. The period soon after a rotation was also 
when locals were most likely to transcend the role of facilitator and become impromptu 
cultural and political advisers to the military, e.g. when counselling liaison officers on 
the best way to achieve positive results in meetings with the local mayor. The most 
significant changes in locals’ working lives, however, came when one national 
contingent was replaced by another or the multinational force chose to draw down 
troops from an area altogether. A change of national contingent meant that, under 
NATO policy, locals’ pay rates (set by the contributing army) were also subject to 
change. Around Doboj and Maglaj, British troops were replaced first by Danes and later 
by Poles in the late 1990s. A senior British officer recalled that the transition from 
Danish to Polish employers had involved a significant pay cut for local interpreters (the Danish army had maintained a high level of pay), before SFOR pulled out of the area 
altogether and the remaining interpreters were left unemployed, with no redeployment 
system.
41 
Local interpreters directly employed by the SFOR headquarters organisation, on the 
other hand, saw their recruitment, evaluation and training arrangements significantly 
changed in the late 1990s with the introduction of a centralized professional language 
service. The changes began in 1998, when the chief of staff at the Sarajevo headquarters 
asked a senior linguist at NATO’s European military headquarters (SHAPE) to visit 
BiH and recommend ways of improving linguistic support. The linguist, who compared 
his role to that of a ‘management consultant’ when interviewed in 2009, found that few 
if any of the local interpreters had had professional training as linguists and that many 
had not even been properly assessed. After visiting ten SFOR locations (including three 
support sites in Croatia), he recommended the establishment of a centralized linguistic 
service which would be run by two experienced professional civilian linguists who were 
native speakers of English, replacing the many non linguist military supervisors 
scattered around the headquarters organization. The heads of the new linguistic service 
would revise translations in order to provide on the job training and quality control, job 
descriptions would be written so that managers could assess what qualifications were 
required for each job, and existing staff would be evaluated to make sure they met the 
new standards. The review identified 54 posts for local nationals, 23 in a central pool in 
Sarajevo and 31 at those SFOR offices which would remain open after a drawdown of 
troops. In September 2000, 48 locally employed linguists were tested for the positions. 
Eight or ten had their rolling three month contracts terminated after poor test results, 
while the rest were given longer contracts and assigned to jobs on the basis of their 
qualifications and professional experience. A further manpower and organization review in February 2001 recommended 44 linguist positions overall, with sixteen located in the 
central office (including the two ‘internationals’) and the remainder in other towns or 
other Sarajevo offices.
42 
The adage ‘traduttore–tradittore’ (Italian for ‘translator–traitor’), usually applied to 
the idea that a translator can never remain entirely faithful to a source text, takes on 
sinister overtones in conflict situations (an observation made by several of this author’s 
colleagues). Local interpreters are still situated in their family and community, 
emotionally if not physically, while forming part (admittedly an unarmed, somewhat 
differently dressed part) of a foreign military force which has different interests and 
objectives. A British language trainer felt that, despite the significant advantages of 
employing native speakers as linguists, the practice also brought two disadvantages. 
First, native speakers (whether locals or émigrés) might feel that the extremely direct 
phrasing of a British interlocutor should not be put that way, and second, they would 
also ‘normally bring some form of baggage […] in terms of values, [or] contacts.’
43 
Their ‘baggage’ might include personal conflicts, family matters, blackmail pressures or 
even plans for revenge. Employers also had to be aware of the risk an interpreter might 
communicate with local intelligence services. This participant in fact argued the risk 
had become even more acute in later conflicts when interpreters could have access to 
personal communications devices even while living on base. The Bosnian Croat 
intelligence service (SNS), for one, was known to have actively attempted to recruit 
interpreters after an SFOR raid in October 1999 uncovered details of four operations 
targeting international organizations.
44 Even after Dayton, there was a continued need 
for peacekeeping forces to supplement their local linguist workforce with personnel 
from their own ranks. 
 Interpreters from troop-contributing nations 
 
Michael Cronin’s distinction between ‘autonomous’ and ‘heteronomous’ methods of 
recruiting interpreters in a colonial context has already been applied to ex Yugoslavia 
by Mia Dragović Drouet. In an autonomous system, ‘colonizers train their own subjects 
in the language or languages of the colonized’, whereas in a heteronomous system local 
interpreters were taught ‘the imperial language’ instead.
45 One may, of course, dispute 
whether the colonial comparison is appropriate (and it is beyond the scope of this article 
to engage with Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin’s controversial critique of the 
international administration in BiH as an analogue of the British Raj in India
46), yet the 
distinction between recruitment systems reminds the historian that either choice would 
introduce certain skill sets, conceptual frameworks and loyalties into the interpretation 
process. Since so few people in the UNPROFOR troop contributing nations spoke the 
languages used in BiH, in practice most interpreter recruitment was heteronomous.
47 
However, the peacekeeping forces did also train some of their own personnel to speak 
the languages as well as sending heritage speakers to BiH.  
The foreign military forces in BiH arguably had more need to language train their own 
personnel than other international organizations, which did not deal with classified 
information (therefore did not require security cleared translation or listening staff) and 
which were less likely to encounter extreme danger. Military interpreters and (perhaps 
their gradual replacements) international civilian contractors were a necessary 
supplement to local staff, although the particular circumstances of the BiH theatre 
required militaries to rethink their handling of language support. During the Second 
World War and the Cold War, most military linguists had been trained as interrogators 
and/or communications intelligence analysts. Interrogation was not a core military task in BiH, since – unlike the aftermath of the Second World War – war crimes 
investigation was the responsibility of an international civilian court, not the military. 
Military interpreters in the field spent most of their time on operational tasks in 
situations where it would be unsafe or unreliable to send a local.  
When the Yugoslav conflict broke out, the British Army appears to have had only 
three heritage speakers of the local language(s). According to a memoir by one of them, 
MiloŠ Stanković, the UN had at first refused to allow personnel with ex Yugoslav 
family backgrounds to serve as observers for the same reasons of neutrality that 
personnel of Greek or Turkish origin would not have been allowed to operate in similar 
roles in Cyprus.
48 As the UK prepared to send an entire battalion to UNPROFOR and 
procedures changed, all three heritage speakers were asked to become military 
interpreters for the British force. The three men were all from a Serb background. Two 
had family in the Krajina region of Croatia, which had been taken over by a Serb militia, 
whereas Stanković’s father came from Mrčajevci, a village in central Serbia (more 
famous for producing the celebrated singer of Serbian newly composed folk music, 
Miroslav Ilić). For security reasons, the interpreters’ real identities were concealed and 
they were assigned the non Slavic pseudonyms of ‘Nick Abbott’, ‘Nick Costello’ and 
‘Mike Stanley’ – this last denoting Stanković, who angrily observes that he had initially 
been asked to deploy as ‘Captain Laurel’.
49 For military interpreters to be marked as 
members of a particular ethnicity would have removed the appearance of neutrality 
which enabled them to take part in contacts with all three armies. It would also expose 
them to the same risks that local interpreters faced on the ‘wrong’ side of the ethnic 
lines. 
The Army’s experience with its three heritage speakers was mixed. ‘Abbott’, a 
corporal in the Royal Anglian Regiment, was apparently withdrawn from the theatre after three months when the Bosnian Croat army (HVO) discovered his background and 
threatened his life.
50 ‘Costello’ served in BiH for two years and other British officers’ 
memoirs praise his service frequently. He was awarded the Queen’s Gallantry Medal in 
1993 for his actions during an evacuation of civilians from Konjević Polje, remained in 
the Army and by 2008, when he spoke at a special service commemorating British 
troops’ service in BiH, had reverted to his real name, Nick Ilić.
51 Stanković was 
assigned to interpret for Brigadier Andrew Cumming at the British support base in Split, 
then for the Cheshires in central Bosnia and later for General Sir Michael Rose in 
Sarajevo when Rose assumed command of the UN force in BiH. He felt unsuited to the 
memorization skills required of an interpreter
52 – corroboration of one professional 
interpreter’s unrelated observation that language proficiency is only one aspect of 
interpretation skills
53 – so resolved to carve out a wider role as a liaison officer. He 
eventually became a liaison between the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and the VRS office at the Lukavica barracks near Sarajevo airport, where he 
had to establish a close rapport with the VRS liaison officer, a counter intelligence 
specialist named Milenko Inñić, in order to ensure the distribution of UN aid convoys. 
While in Sarajevo, Stanković also participated in an unofficial operation to evacuate 
civilians across the siege line. He returned to the UK in April 1995, but his career ended 
acrimoniously when the Ministry of Defence police arrested him on charges of 
espionage in 1997. He was later cleared of the charges and sued the police force for 
compensation, although a judge dismissed the case in 2007.
54. 
A more realistic method of providing language support for tasks which local civilian 
interpreters could not be asked to do was to give non heritage speaker personnel three 
to five months of intensive training and then deploy them for six months as military 
colloquial speakers or interpreters. The courses, held at the Defence School of Languages in Beaconsfield, contained participants ‘from lance corporals through to 
major’ whose personnel records showed an aptitude for languages, in most cases a 
degree but sometimes A levels. Some, but not all, had previous knowledge of another 
Slavonic language, Russian. Personnel from many ‘different arms and corps’ of the 
Services were chosen for the courses, with the Royal Army Educational Corps and the 
Royal Corps of Signals particularly well represented. The RAEC, which had just been 
amalgamated into the Adjutant General’s Corps as the Education and Training Service, 
was apparently keen to increase its profile by sending personnel on operations, whereas 
the Signals had classified intelligence responsibilities which required linguists. Military 
interpreters took on rewarding and essential tasks but were detached from their own 
units and could not fully participate in the practices of re affirming battalion and 
regimental identity which formed an important part of British military culture. As one 
remarked: 
the plight of… military interpreters is, we get, not literally, but parachuted in. 
We get plucked out of our wherever we are, our education centres or whatever 
we’re, job we’re doing, and dumped in a whole environment with people that 
we’ve never met before […] they already had their friendships, their protocols, 
and here we were, these odd people who had different cap badges […] And at 
the end of the operation you’re parachuted or airlifted back out, plonked back in 
your education centre, never to see any of these people again. And so you can’t 
say, um, oh do you remember when we got shot at, do you remember when we 
were ambushed, it doesn’t happen. […] you get dumped in and then you get 
dumped out again.
55 
Judging by the information in the Srebrenica report, British battalions were better 
equipped with military interpreters than were their Dutch counterparts. The first Dutch battalion, which arrived in 1994, only acquired a military interpreter after its 
commanding officer had found that, with only Bosniak interpreters available inside the 
enclave, he could not make contact with the VRS. An army interpreter, Paul Lindgreen, 
was duly sent from the Netherlands and was able to assist the designated liaison officer 
as well as to interpret in a narrow sense. After returning, he also prepared a lessons 
learned report on interpretation and cultural training. In Srebrenica, however, the level 
of direct language support from the Dutch army declined after Lindgreen’s departure. 
His replacement in the second battalion, ‘a Dutch solder who spoke Serbo Croat and 
could interpret’, was not quite so experienced, while the commander of the third and last 
Dutch battalion had apparently tried and failed to have a military interpreter sent at all.
56 
The Dutch army admittedly had fewer troop commitments in BiH than the British and 
had nothing like so many high ranking officers at headquarters who required language 
support. Even at the battalion level, however, the Dutch approach to peacekeeping 
which minimized contact with the local population went hand in hand with a lower 
requirement for interpreters. The third Dutch battalion had four interpreters,
57 whereas 
the Cheshires had employed 15 and 1 DWR, a year later, had had 41. 
Troop numbers surged when IFOR arrived in BiH in December 1995 but were then 
reduced to below UNPROFOR levels from late 1996 onwards as IFOR changed to 
SFOR. This reduced troop contributing nations’ commitments as a whole but not 
necessarily the need for military interpreters. Since many contributing armies had been 
involved in BiH for several years, they had rather more ‘military colloquial speakers’ of 
the local language(s) than they had had at the start of the operation and could sometimes 
use them to supplement or replace local interpreters in tasks such as liaison visits.
58 
Thus Captain Paul Sulyok, a liaison officer with 2 LI, had already been trained in ‘Serbo Croat’. He had served a tour in Goražde in 1994–95 and was able to contribute 
to the battalion’s pre deployment training for platoon commanders.
59  
Although after Dayton personal safety considerations far less often precluded the use 
of a local civilian interpreter, security restrictions still imposed a need for some linguists 
to be recruited from outside BiH (also a potential problem in public service interpreting). 
Local nationals could not get security clearances because they were not citizens of an 
SFOR country and were all in a sense considered to come from one of the Bosnian 
‘factions’. Indeed, SFOR was therefore unable to provide linguistic support for any 
classified material until it employed the two British staff to manage its new centralized 
linguistic service in 2000.
60 Most UK civilian and military defence staff would have a 
‘secret’ clearance, awarded on the basis of background checks with the Ministry of 
Defence, the UK security services, the police and credit reference agencies. ‘Top secret’ 
clearance, which additionally involved a security interview and several character 
references, was required for members of ‘sensitive units’ such as the Intelligence 
Corps.
61 Reliable background checks could not be carried out for staff of non SFOR 
nationalities, since it was considered that their governments might have their own 
reasons to return a favourable result. 
The US Army arrived in BiH with IFOR in December 1995 and used its own military 
interpreters for certain duties, such as liaison with the Russian base at Ugljevik, within 
the US zone. Preparations for deployment included mobilising 3,800 reservists and 
introducing so called ‘Turbo Serbo’ courses, a conversion course for existing Russian 
linguists.
62 The US contingent contained a larger intelligence component than other 
countries’ contributions: its intelligence activities focused on psychological and 
information operations and intelligence gathering for force protection, plus, one may 
assume, covert activity. Many of the extra military linguists came from the 300th Military Intelligence Brigade (Linguist), a National Guard brigade based in Utah. The 
brigade – which apparently owed its Utah location to the fact that so many Utahns had 
learned foreign languages and lived abroad as Mormon missionaries – supplied five 
member teams to ‘plug into’ other units as required, but an audit in 1994 had revealed 
that 78 per cent of the teams (across all languages) were understaffed and 73 per cent of 
teams had at least one underskilled member.
63 Shortages of linguists would become 
even more acute in 2001, when the aftermath of 9/11 and the US interventions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq suddenly required a much higher volume of linguists who spoke 
Arabic and the Afghan languages of Pashtu and Dari.  
The US force kept up with SFOR’s increasing emphasis on civilianization and 
increasingly relied on civilian interpreters contracted from the US for tasks which locals 
were not allowed to do. A contract agency, TRW Incorporated (later Northrop 
Grumman), recruited civilians as linguists for the US Army. These civilians fell into 
three categories, I (locally recruited, with no security clearance; most interpreters 
belonged to this category), II (‘secret’ clearance) and III (‘top secret’ clearance). In BiH, 
TRW administered the recruitment and testing of Category I local interpreters who 
would be contracted to TRW and work with the US forces. It also recruited the 
Category II and III linguists in the US, typically from the relevant diaspora communities. 
TRW recruiters would ‘focus on known concentrations of people having the target 
language’ and recruit through acquaintances, newspaper and radio advertising and word 
of mouth. Approximately half of all applicants would be rejected after initial screening 
(medical and security checks and a check for US citizenship) and another half of those 
remaining would fail the language testing.  
The successful applicants received training in ‘military culture’ and force protection 
at Fort Benning, in order ‘to prepare the interpreters for life in a combat zone and Army life’. They then took on a number of intelligence tasks in theatre, including field human 
intelligence, listening in on voice transmissions, translating classified documents and 
being present at local employee screenings and prisoner interrogations. A report by 
three US intelligence officers and military interpreters who had served in BiH and 
Kosovo presented several recommendations for tasking interpreters effectively, 
including the observation that ‘interpreters working in interrogation operations […] 
become known to the prisoners as part of the unfriendly side of the Peace Force’ and 
should not be sent out with teams which were ‘trying to build trust and confidence in a 
sector’. Only Category II and III interpreters could wear a US flag on their uniform. The 
intelligence officers’ report also recommended that the security cleared interpreters 
should not share living quarters with the locals.
64 Such measures, which signalled the 
contractors’ different status (effectively, a higher status) in everyday, ‘banal’ ways, 
implicitly enforced a separation between civilian contractors and locals, potentially 




The individuals who facilitated conversations during meetings, patrols or interrogations, 
who advised their military employers or fellow soldiers about the history, culture and 
society of the area and who acted as fixers and liaisons in roles which sometimes went 
well beyond a narrow definition of ‘language support’ were universally referred to in 
military and journalistic English as ‘interpreters’. Very few of them, however, would 
have been trained or classified as interpreters (or translators) according to the standards 
of the profession itself. Experienced professional translators from former Yugoslavia 
were recruited very quickly, so language teachers were the next best option for an employer seeking local ‘interpreters’, although there was no guarantee they would be 
competent in translation or interpretation skills.
65 As the provision of language support 
for peacekeeping in BiH moved from desperation to professionalization, some local 
staff were able to accumulate cultural and social capital within the ‘field’ of the 
linguistic profession. Professional advancement as a linguist was more difficult for 
military linguists from the troop contributing nations, where career structures for 
linguists tended to relate only to intelligence work rather than the emerging idea of 
‘operational language support’, which was only in its infancy – if that – during the BiH 
period.  
The experience of peacekeeping in BiH, combined with NATO’s mid 1990s 
preparations to incorporate central and eastern European states in several rounds of 
enlargement, nonetheless began to lead some military planners to give languages more 
consideration – although their policies and practices would be revised again after the 
forces’ first engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan in the early 2000s. NATO’s Ad Hoc 
Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping recommended in 1997 that NATO members 
provide their soldiers with more training in the common language of the mission 
(effectively, in English) and also in the local language: 
There is a need for a common language capability among units deployed on 
missions. This is essential to both the execution of the mission and the day to 
day administration of deployed forces. […] With regard to local language 
capability, access to competent interpreters and translators is required as an 
integral part of the mission, since it may not be possible, or desirable, to rely 
entirely on locally recruited staff for these roles.
66  However, no force was able to commit the resources in personnel, money and time it 
would have taken to meet all its language support needs internally, producing a constant 
demand for locals to work as linguists.  
The extreme pay differentials between employees of international organizations and 
their neighbours remained a characteristic of life in BiH long after the Dayton 
agreement. Rijad Bahić, a local interpreter employed by TRW to work at the US base in 
Tuzla, had been conscripted by the ABiH at the age of 19 after finishing secondary 
school in 1994. Several of his friends had died in May 1995 when the VRS shelled the 
town centre, killing 71 young civilians. He had been demobilized after the Dayton 
agreement and was quickly hired by TRW. In 2001, he was paid US $1000 a month, 
while his neurologist brother in law earned half as much and the average wage in the 
Tuzla area was approximately US $200.
67 The tension between injecting money into the 
local economy and causing a brain drain of qualified professionals was recognised by 
SFOR staff. A British logistics major, Mark Gore, who in 1999 was in charge of civilian 
recruitment for all British units within one of SFOR’s three zones (Multi National 
Division South West, where Britain was the lead nation) explained that the average 
wage for a school teacher was around 300 Deutschmarks per month, yet: 
If he speaks English and we employ him, his wage will be multiplied by at least 
three. On one hand he will increase his consumption, but on the other, he will 
pull someone useful out off [sic] the school. And that is only one example. 
Therefore we have to find a balance.
68  
According to Robert Barry, the US diplomat who led the Organization for Security and 
Co Operation in Europe (OSCE) mission to BiH, more should have been done to 
prevent a brain drain of local professionals into employment with the ‘internationals’ which ultimately damaged the Bosnian public sphere. Barry wrote in a lessons learned 
document for Helsinki Monitor during the crisis in Kosovo: 
We should not let the international agencies and NGOs coming to Kosovo do 
what they did in Bosnia – bid against each other for qualified local staff. Doing 
so results in people who should be the judges and editors becoming the drivers 
and interpreters at wages higher than cabinet ministers receive.
69  
However, the profession of linguist was a valid option in its own right and locals who 
wanted to build long term careers in it might have disputed this equation of their 
profession with drivers. Such locals – if they worked for the headquarters organization – 
saw their career prospects advanced by the introduction of a centralized language 
service under SFOR, which offered a professional development pathway and 
contemporary western management ideology to the staff directly employed by NATO. 
Indeed, in 2009 the head of the linguistic services branch at NATO’s Sarajevo 
headquarters was a Bosnian who had originally been a UNPROFOR interpreter.
70 Many 
other local linguists moved on to work for other organizations, often the International 
Police Task Force, and some more acquired career opportunities more indirectly by 
using professional or personal contacts they had made while working with the 
peacekeeping forces to obtain employment abroad. This included a number of female 
interpreters who married or struck up a relationship with a foreign soldier and moved to 
his home country (the author has not yet heard of any male interpreter/female soldier or 
same sex relationships). Others yet, however, did regard their jobs as sidelines or 
interruptions, or stoically viewed the work as a short term adaptation to (post )wartime 
circumstances rather than a lifelong career choice. One woman dismissed by SFOR 
during the centralization replied ‘I’ve had four great years […] maybe it’s time for me 
to get serious’ when her manager broke the news to her.
71  Although the system of employing local interpreters was problematic, alternatives 
might have been even more so. Warnings about local employees’ hard currency salaries 
unbalancing the economy served the purposes, intentionally or not, both of 
organizations seeking to cut costs and of unscrupulous opština officials – yet real 
equality between the ‘Local Civilian Hires’ and ‘International Civilian Contractors’ 
would have required sufficiently skilled locals to have been paid even more and 
insufficiently skilled locals to be given access to the training required to open up the 
higher pay grades. Time limiting individuals’ employment terms, a policy the opština 
had enforced in Srebrenica (although not for interpreters), would have restricted their 
career progression (once that concept had been introduced into their working lives) and 
deprived the battalions which rotated into and out of ‘theatre’ every six months of staff 
who were more or less familiar with military working practices. Employment was in 
any case shared out among families, although the one family member policy could not 
be perfectly enforced. Besides, the definition of ‘family’ for UN purposes may not have 
accorded with the local understandings of extended family, cousin networks and semi 
familial best man/godfather relationships (‘kumstvo’) which formed part of the concept 
of ‘family’ in BiH. 
The image of the translator, interpreter or linguist as a neutral facilitator of 
communication between cultures does not last long in the case of BiH, nor should it 
elsewhere. One complication of the neutrality ethic was that military language personnel 
were deeply involved in achieving military objectives and even local staff were 
supposed to identify their interests with their military employers’. Well trained, well 
treated, knowledgeable and loyal local interpreters were force multipliers, making small 
numbers of troops more effective in peace enforcement than larger units without 
adequate language support: accordingly, treating interpreters with moral and financial respect maximised a force’s chances of success. The ideal of neutrality was undermined 
on a further level by the realities and stereotypes involved in intercultural contact. Miloš 
Stanković felt drawn, according to the self representation in his memoir, towards 
sentimental relationships with both Bosniak and Serb Sarajevans on the basis of his own 
background yet resented having to narrate his Serb family’s past in order to gain 
credibility with the VRS. For non native speakers, especially soldiers whose language 
training had been minimal or informal, contact with different languages was in large 
part an encounter with otherness. Dutch soldiers who served in BiH in 1999–2000, 
several years after Srebrenica, still located themselves in what Liora Sion describes as a 
‘peacekeeping space’ which confirmed their identities as combat capable masculine 
soldiers and discouraged them from contact with locals, who were presumed hostile.
72 
Lawrence Venuti has argued that the frequent ‘invisibility’ of the translator reflects ‘a 
complacency in […] relations with cultural others’.
73 To directly ask about linguists in 
peacekeeping, in an interview or as the objective of a research project itself, can prompt 
a respondent to make new conceptual connections, bring out information which had 
been taken for granted and mark out a field of knowledge as it goes along. 
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